O Supremo Tribunal Federal e os limites do ativismo judicial: uma análise dos impactos sobre o princípio da separação dos poderes

Abstract

This study analyzes the constitutional limits of the Federal Supreme Court of Brazil actions in light of the expansion of constitutional jurisdiction and its impact on the principle of separation of powers within the Brazilian democratic rule of law. It begins with the premise that the 1988 Federal Constitution institutionally strengthened the Federal Supreme Court of Brazil, expanding its mechanisms for constitutional review and assigning it a central role in the realization of fundamental rights. In this context, the study investigates the circumstances under which the Court's expansive role particularly regarding legislative omissions and shortcomings in public policy formulation may exceed the boundaries of the judicial function and create tension with the autonomy of politically legitimate branches of government. To this end, a qualitative study was conducted using bibliographic and documentary methods, analyzing domestic and foreign legal scholarship, constitutional legislation, and Federal Supreme Court of Brazil case law highlighting landmark decisions such as those concerning the writ of injunction, Binding Precedent No. 13, and ADPF 347. The results demonstrate that the Federal Supreme Court of Brazil prominent role is a legitimate consequence of the constitutional model established in 1988, especially regarding the protection of fundamental rights and the addressing of state omissions. However, it was found that certain manifestations of judicial activism can result in the replacement of primary policy choices, the creation of general normative rules, and the expansion of judicial powers beyond constitutionally established limits, thereby creating tension with the system of checks and balances and the separation of powers. The study concludes that preserving institutional balance requires adopting parameters that distinguish the legitimate realization of the Constitution from practices of excessive judicial expansion, advocating for the importance of judicial self-restraint and models of dialogic constitutionalism.