Liberdade humana e presciência divina em Agostinho de Hipona

Abstract

The present study investigates the relationship between human freedom and divine foreknowledge in the thought of Augustine of Hippo, based on a comparative analysis of the works On Free Choice of the Will (De libero arbitrio, 388–395) and On the Predestination of the Saints (De praedestinatione sanctorum, 429). Considering that, in both works, Augustine simultaneously affirms human freedom and divine foreknowledge, the problem arises concerning the compatibility between human moral freedom and divine omniscience, since everything that God foreknows necessarily comes to pass. In light of this, the study examines how Augustine articulates these concepts throughout his intellectual itinerary. The understanding of human freedom and divine foreknowledge in On Free Choice of the Will and On the Predestination of the Saints is analyzed, in order to investigate whether there is continuity or rupture between these formulations, which correspond to distinct moments in the development of the author’s thought. It is observed that, in On Free Choice of the Will, there is an internal inflection in the notion of freedom: from a conception according to which the human will would be capable of both fall and self-redemption, to a progressive understanding of freedom as requiring divine assistance. In this initial phase, divine foreknowledge, although conceived in a predominantly contemplative manner, functions chiefly as a guarantor of human freedom, since its object is the free movement of the will, without implying causal interference in its exercise. In the mature phase of Augustine’s thought, especially in On the Predestination of the Saints, divine foreknowledge is reconfigured and assumes an active and efficacious character, intrinsically linked to the doctrine of grace and predestination. God not only foreknows human actions, but also knows and governs the human will, electing from eternity those to whom He grants efficacious grace, through which free will is restored and oriented toward the Supreme Good. This conception does not eliminate human freedom, but understands it as a constitutive structure of the person, expressed differently between the elect, who are enabled by grace to perform the good, and the non-elect, whose freedom remains oriented toward sin. Thus, no radical rupture is found between the works analyzed, but rather a structural continuity in the affirmation of human freedom as the foundation of moral responsibility in the face of divine sovereignty