Responsabilidade pessoal em Hannah Arendt: o julgamento de Adolf Eichmann

Abstract

The research in question presents the study developed about the notion of personal responsibility, in the thought of the philosopher and contemporary political theorist Hannah Arendt, starting from the account that the author makes of the trial of Adolf Eichmann, from which her work: Eichmann in Jerusalem: a report about the banality of evil. Otto Adolf Eichman was one of the architects of the “Final Solution”, a plan that aimed to annihilate the Jewish people during the Nazi regime. Eichmann was put on trial accused of crimes against the Jewish people, crimes against humanity and war crimes among others. Faced with these accusations, Eichmann pleaded not guilty as reported by the author in her work, therefore, he exempts himself from responsibility for his actions. And it is in this scenario that the issue of personal responsibility comes into discussion. The idea of personal responsibility, which must be understood in contrast to political (collective) responsibility, which concerns the collective being held accountable for certain actions, is another very important concept for understanding this study. The question of the absence of thought activity is a crucial point in this discussion. In this way, the research discusses these questions, in order to understand the notion of personal responsibility addressed by the author, aiming to clarify what would be the responsibility of Otto Adolf Eichmann in relation to the crimes he perpetrated